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ABSTRACT
Various techniques need to be combined to realize anony-
mously authenticated communication. Cryptographic tools
enable anonymous user authentication while anonymous com-
munication protocols hide users’ IP addresses from service
providers. One simple approach for realizing anonymously
authenticated communication is their simple combination,
but this gives rise to another issue; how to build a secure
channel. The current public key infrastructure cannot be
used since the user’s public key identifies the user. To cope
with this issue, we propose a protocol that uses identity-
based encryption for packet encryption without sacrificing
anonymity, and group signature for anonymous user authen-
tication. Communications in the protocol take place through
proxy entities that conceal users’ IP addresses from service
providers. The underlying group signature is customized to
meet our objective and improve its efficiency. We also intro-
duce a proof-of-concept implementation to demonstrate the
protocol’s feasibility. We compare its performance to SSL
communication and demonstrate its practicality, and con-
clude that the protocol realizes secure, anonymous, and au-
thenticated communication between users and service providers
with practical performance.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and Protection; H.1.m [Information System]: Mod-
els and Principles—Miscellaneous; E.3 [Data]: Data En-
cryption—Public key cryptosystems
General Terms
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1. INTRODUCTION
Anonymity1 is an important aspect of privacy, and sys-
tems that provide services to anonymous users are currently
a topic of keen interest. Such systems can provide services
to users without revealing their identity. To date, a great
deal of studies have been reported on [2], and many use
cryptography as the important building block for construct-
ing the systems, but these need further improvement be-
fore they can be used for actual services. To realize secure,
anonymous, and authenticated communication, these build-
ing blocks need to collaborate with each other.
1.1 Research Background
Several cryptographic primitives providing anonymity have
been proposed. Among them is group signature [10], which
enables a signer to anonymously prove signatures’ validity.
A group manager (GM) that has a pair of a group public
key, gpk, and master secret key, msk, issues a secret signing
key, ski, to a user Ui, which computes a group signature, σ
(on certain messages), using ski. No user-dependent value is
required in the verification phase; a verifier verifies σ using
only the corresponding gpk. These approaches alone, how-
ever, cannot guarantee anonymity when applied to online
communication. For instance, let a signer compute a group
signature and send it to a verifier. The verifier can anony-
mously verify the signature’s validity. However, there is a
question of how to anonymously send the group signature
to the verifier. Usually, a source IP address is included in a
packet, and that reveals the identity of the sender, thus user
anonymity is already infringed upon. The situation remains
the same regardless of the primitives we implement so long
as direct communication between a sender (signer, prover,
etc) and a receiver (verifier, etc) is required.
The user’s IP address is naturally visible in the IP packets
sent from the user, and it cannot simply be erased or forged
1This paper considers sender/prover anonymity and does
not consider recipient anonymity.
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to enable bi-directional communication. One approach for
this is using intermediate agents that send packets on be-
half of the actual user terminal, and several such protocols
have already been proposed [2], including Tor [5]. Never-
theless, another issue arises in the question of how we can
assure user’s legitimacy. We need to discern legitimate and
illegitimate users to restrict unauthorized access to the chan-
nel. One might think that only end-to-end authentication is
needed, but it is hard to authenticate users without identi-
fying them. For instance, a server needs to send a response
code to a user in basic authentication and the user needs to
return a user ID and password. That is, the server needs
to identify the user. Moreover, it seems to be hard to send
a certain message back from the server to a user since the
corresponding source IP address is generally required. Au-
thentication by an intermediate agent (as in Tor [5]) might
be a solution to these problems. The agent can authenticate
a user and can hide the user’s source IP address from the
server. That notwithstanding, we still need to know how the
server can directly authenticate end users.
A simple approach to the anonymous authentication prob-
lems is just combining both cryptographic primitives and
anonymous communication protocols as follows. Let a user
compute an anonymously-authenticated token (e.g., group
signature), and send it to a server via an anonymous chan-
nel (e.g., using Tor). Then, the server can directly authen-
ticate the user without compromising anonymity. However,
another problem arises is how we can establish a secure chan-
nel (i.e., flowed data is encrypted). If the server uses a user’s
public key (certified by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA)
in a public key infrastructure (PKI)), then server identifies
the user, since a certificate contains information on the key
holder. The same problem arises even if symmetric key en-
cryption is used. Assume that the server tries to exchange a
secret key with an end user. Since the server does not know
who the actual end user is, the server does not know the
user’s public key for running a key exchange protocol.
1.2 Our Contribution
We propose a protocol that realizes secure, anonymous,
and authenticated communication. The proposed proto-
col uses identity-based encryption (IBE) to encrypt content
without identifying key holders2. It can set arbitrary values
on public keys, thus it can enable a user to select a tem-
porary ID for each session, which the server can use as a
public key. It also uses group signature for anonymous user
authentication. Communications in the protocol take place
through proxy entities that conceal users’ IP addresses from
service providers (SPs).
This paper gives the framework of the proposed protocol,
gives a formal model and security definitions of the pro-
posed protocol, points out the needlessness of the group sig-
nature’s open capability for our usage, and then proposes
an open-free variant of the Furukawa-Imai group signature
scheme [13]. The modification can reduce its signature size
2The conventional public key encryption (PKE) with certain
non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs may also be
applicable, where a user chooses a temporary public key for
each session, and makes a NIZK proof of the correspond-
ing secret key. We do not consider this construction any-
more since the NIZK proof must be constructed from scratch
by considering algebraic structures of the underlying PKE
scheme, and this may lead to some difficulty of its imple-
mentation.
by 50% compared to the original scheme. Note that if some-
one needs to identify an illegitimate user, we can add such
a mechanism without relying on cryptographic techniques;
e.g., an IP address managed by the proxy.
We demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of the pro-
posed protocol by introducing our proof-of-concept imple-
mentation. The implementation uses the modified group
signature scheme mentioned above. It also uses the Boneh-
Franklin IBE scheme [9] for its underlying IBE scheme.
Note that, our protocol in this paper focuses on encrypted
communication from the SP to users. It can easily be ex-
tended to interactive secure communication since SP is not
anonymous to users and each user thus can simply use SP’s
public key for building a secure channel.
1.3 Related Work
There exist similar attempts to our approach. Sudarsono
et al. [21] has considered an anonymous IEEE802.1X authen-
tication system by using a group signature scheme. They use
group signatures as the client’s digital certificate. The means
of sending such certificates over IP networks was, however,
outside its scope. Lee et al. [16] proposed an anonymous
subscription service, called Anon-pass. Their construction
methodology is similar to group signatures, wherein a user
proves the possession of signatures using zero-knowledge proofs.
Though Anon-pass does not consider end-to-end secure (en-
crypted) communication, our protocol does.
Gilad and Herzberg [14] also considered how to distribute
public keys using an anonymous service. They consider two
peers, a querier and a responder. The querier specifies a
random ephemeral public key that is not certified by the
CA, and sends a query containing this public key to a re-
sponder via an anonymous service, like Tor. The responder
replies with a response message encrypted by the (anony-
mous) querier’s ephemeral public key. However, a respon-
der cannot check whether a public key is a valid key or a
random value since this scheme gives no certification of the
public key, and moreover the responder cannot detect even
if the pubic key is replaced by an attacker. Moreover, no
anonymous user authentication is considered in the Gilad-
Herzberg system. In our protocol, the SP can be convinced
that a public key (i.e., a temporary ID) will work, since ar-
bitrary values can be public keys in IBE systems. Moreover,
since a temporary ID is signed by group signature, we can
prevent the key replacement attack and can achieve anony-
mous user authentication, simultaneously.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) (e.g., [18]) is another candi-
date. In our context, first users compute re-encryption keys
using their secret key and the SP public key, and the SP
only computes ciphertext using its own public key. Then,
the proxy can re-encrypt ciphertexts. However, the proxy
needs to manage all re-encryption keys, and therefore it is
difficult to assume that no private information is infringed
on even if the proxy is corrupted after the communication.
Moreover, there is a possibility that other user may decrypt
unexpected ciphertexts, since the proxy manages many re-
encryption keys (from the SP to each user). It is undesirable
to generate re-encryption keys that can be used in an unex-
pected manner, even if the proxy is modeled as an honest-
but-curious entity and always follows the protocol. In our
protocol no unexpected user (including the proxy) can de-
crypt ciphertexts, since a unique temporary ID is assigned
for each user and each session. Note that the key escrow
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Figure 1: Framework of the Proposed Protocol
problem happens as an outcome of IBE, where key gener-
ation center (KGC) can decrypt all ciphertexts. However,
KGC is modeled as a trusted third party, whereas it is dif-
ficult to fully trust all proxies involved in the systems.
2. FRAMEWORK
Figure 1 depicts the framework of the proposed protocol,
which has five roles; User, Proxy, Service Provider, GM, and
KGC. A User wishes to communicate with an SP without
revealing its identity. The Proxy assists communication be-
tween a User and SP by relaying packets without revealing
the User’s IP address. We assume that it is honest-but-
curious. The SP provides services to Users, but wishes to
authenticate them. It does not care about their identities
but needs to confirm whether the user accessing it is legit-
imate. The GM manages a group key and issuer key, and
issues a signing key for a user that is used for generating
an anonymously-authenticated token. We assume that the
GM suitably authenticates a user before issuing the signing
key. The KGC generates a decryption key for a user. We
assume that the KGC suitably authenticates a user before
issuing the decryption key.
These roles need to collaborate with each other to realize
the proposed secure anonymous authentication. Their inter-
action sequence is as follows. (1) A user (whose IP address
is Adrsrc) chooses a temporary ID TempID, (2) computes
a group signature σ on TempID, and (3) sends (σ, TempID)
to the proxy. (4) The proxy associates Adrsrc with this
temporary ID, and (5) forwards (σ, TempID) to the SP. (6)
The SP can directly authenticate the users by verifying the
group signature without compromising anonymous commu-
nications. (7) If the user is successfully verified, the SP
encrypts content using TempID as the public key of IBE;
otherwise it returns ⊥. Here, we apply an IBE’s property
to establish a secure channel between the SP and an anony-
mous user, where arbitrary values can be a public key, and
a ciphertext can be independently computed with the gen-
eration of the corresponding decryption key3. (8) The SP
sends this IBE ciphertext to the proxy, which again (9) for-
wards it to the corresponding user. (10) Finally, the user de-
crypts the IBE ciphertext using the corresponding decryp-
tion key issued by the KGC. After relaying the (mutual)
communication, the proxy immediately deletes the corre-
sponding pair of (TempID, Adrsrc). Therefore, no private in-
3This property is used in timed-release encryption [11] con-
text, where an encryptor can control when ciphertexts will
be decrypted.
formation is infringed on even if the proxy is corrupted after
the communication. Note that Figure 1 explains one-pass
communication. The proxy can reuse the information of the
pair (TempID, Adrsrc) of a session so long as the session is
alive, but it removes the information from its registry once
the session is closed. In either case, the proxy immediately
deletes the corresponding pair (TempID, Adrsrc) after the ses-
sion. Moreover, we can easily extend one-proxy setting to
multi-proxy setting, since all the proxy has to do is (1) man-
age (TempID, Adrsrc), and (2) forwarding (σ, TempID) to the
next. The above framework is embodied as a concrete pro-
tocol in the following section.
3. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
This section proposes a secure anonymous authentication
protocol.4 It first defines the syntax of the protocol, and
then gives its construction. We consider a scenario in which
an SP is modeled as a server, which provides a service only
for a legitimate user. That is, we can assume that the GM
has authenticated a user before issuing a signing key, and
the SP can judge that the user who can generate a valid
group signature is a legitimate user.
3.1 Syntax and Security Definitions
Let ID and M be an identity space and message space,
respectively, and Adrsrc, Adrproxy , and Adrdst stand for IP
address of User, Proxy, and SP, respectively. For a set X
and an element x ∈ X, x
$
← X means that x is randomly
chosen from X.
Definition 3.1 (Syntax of The Protocol).
GM.Setup : This probabilistic algorithm takes as input the
security parameter λ, and outputs a group public key
gpk and an issuer key ik.
KGC.Setup : This probabilistic algorithm takes as input the
security parameter λ, and outputs a public key params
and a master secret key msk.
Join : This probabilistic algorithm takes as input gpk and
ik, and outputs a signing key sk.
UserKeyGen : This (possibly) probabilistic algorithm takes
as input params, msk, and an (possibly temporary)
identity TempID ∈ ID, and outputs a decryption key
dkTempID.
SendRequest : This probabilistic algorithm takes as input
gpk, sk, TempID, a source IP address Adrsrc, a destina-
tion IP address Adrdst, and a proxy IP address Adrproxy,
and send a token σ, TempID and Adrdst to the proxy
whose IP address is Adrproxy .
RelayRequest : This deterministic algorithm takes as input
Adrsrc, Adrdst, an ID/IP table Tbl, σ, and TempID, and
relays a pair (σ, TempID) and Adrproxy to the destina-
tion SP whose IP address is Adrdst. Moreover, append
(TempID, Adrsrc) to Tbl.
4Note that our protocol achieves to send an anonymous to-
ken (group signature) and it is not an authentication pro-
tocol in the strict sense. Nevertheless, we can easily extend
it to an authentication protocol (via the classical challenge-
and-response methodology) as follows: first a SP sends a
random nonce to a User (via the Proxy) and the User com-
putes a group signature whose signed message contains the
nonce. Therefore, we do not further consider the extension
in this paper.
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ValidityCheck : This deterministic algorithm takes as input
gpk, σ, and TempID, and outputs 1 if σ is valid, and 0,
otherwise.
SendContent : This probabilistic algorithm takes as input
gpk, σ, TempID, a content to be sent M ∈ M, and
Adrproxy, computes a ciphertext C if the token σ is
valid, and sends C to the proxy whose IP address is
Adrproxy. Otherwise, if σ is invalid, then return ⊥.
RelayContent : This deterministic algorithm takes as in-
put C and Tbl, and relays C to a user whose IP ad-
dress is Adrsrc contained in Tbl. Moreover, remove
(TempID, Adrsrc) from Tbl. We assume that the proxy
can decide the corresponding source IP address to be
relayed by C5.
GetContent : This deterministic algorithm takes as input C
and dkTempID, and return M .
Next, we give formal security definitions as follows. First,
we define correctness that guarantees σ is valid and a user
always can obtain the corresponding content if all values are
honestly generated according to the algorithms.
Definition 3.2 (Correctness). For all (gpk, ik) ←
GM.Setup(1λ), (params,msk) ← KGC.Setup(1λ), sk ←
Join(gpk, ik),TempID ∈ ID, M ∈ M, and (Adrsrc, Adrdst ,
Adrproxy),
Pr[M ← GetContent
(
RelayContent
(
C, Tbl
)
,
UserKeyGen(param,msk, TempID)
)
] = 1, and
Pr[1← ValidityCheck(gpk, σ, TempID) = 1] = 1
where (σ, TempID, Adrdst)← SendRequest(gpk, sk, TempID,
Adrsrc , Adrdst, Adrproxy), (σ, TempID, Adrproxy)← RelayRequest
(Adrsrc, Adrdst, Tbl, σ, TempID), and C ← SendContent(gpk, σ,
TempID,M, Adrproxy).
Next, we define anonymity, semantic security, and unforge-
ability as follows. One session is defined as sequences of al-
gorithm executions from SendRequest to GetContent, where
SendRequest→ RelayRequest → SendContent→ RelayContent→
GetContent. Anonymity guarantees that no adversary A
who is allowed to communicate with the proxy (but is not
allowed to know Adrsrc) can distinguish whether the users of
two different sessions are the same or not. In this game, A is
modeled as a malicious SP. Moreover, we care about signing
key exposure, where A can obtain signing keys. In addition
to this, we give msk to A in order to guarantee that the
KGC ability has nothing to right for identifying the user6.
Definition 3.3 (Anonymity).
1. The challenger C runs (gpk, ik) ← GM.Setup(1λ) and
(params,msk) ← KGC.Setup(1λ), and computes two
signing keys sk0, sk1 ← Join(gpk, ik), and gives gpk,
sk0, sk1, and (params,msk) to an adversary A. More-
over, C initializes Tbl := ∅.
5For example, port numbers can be used for identifying the
sessions. It’s up to the proxy in our implementation.
6Note that we exclude the trivial case that KGC is offered
to generate a decryption key of TempID from a user whose IP
address is Adrsrc, and observes that the transcript containing
TempID.
2. A is allowed to issue the SendRequest query (i, TempID)
∈ {0, 1} × ID. C runs SendRequest(gpk, skb, TempID,
Adrsrc, Adrdst, Adrproxy), and returns σ (generated via
the SendRequest algorithm) to A.
3. A is allowed to issue the RelayRequest query (σ, TempID).
C runs RelayRequest(Adrsrc, Adrdst, Tbl, σ, TempID) and
updates Tbl.
4. A is allowed to issue the RelayContent query C. C runs
RelayContent(C, Tbl), and updates Tbl.
5. A sends TempID∗ ∈ ID to C. C flips a coin b
$
← {0, 1},
and runs (σ∗, TempID∗, Adrdst)← SendRequest(gpk,
skb, TempID
∗, Adrsrc, Adrdst, Adrproxy) and (σ
∗, TempID∗,
Adrproxy)← RelayRequest(Adrsrc, Adrdst , Tbl, σ
∗, TempID∗).
A returns an arbitrary C to C. C runs C ← RelayContent(C,
Tbl). Note that A can know the transcript of these
algorithms executed by C: (σ∗, TempID∗, Adrdst), (σ
∗,
TempID∗, Adrproxy), and C. A outputs b
′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The protocol is said to have anonymity if Advanonpro,A(λ) :=
|Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| is negligible in λ.
Next, we define semantic security which guarantees that no
information of content M is revealed from the transcripts
of algorithms. In this game, an adversary A is modeled as
a malicious proxy. Moreover, A is allowed to obtain ik in
order to guarantee that no information ofM is revealed even
from the GM’s viewpoint.
Definition 3.4 (Semantic Security).
1. The challenger C runs (gpk, ik) ← GM.Setup(1λ) and
(params,msk) ← KGC.Setup(1λ), and gives gpk, ik,
and params to an adversary A.
2. A is allowed to issue the UserKeyGen query TempID ∈
ID. C runs UserKeyGen(params,msk, TempID) and
returns dkTempID.
3. A sends TempID∗ ∈ ID,M∗0 ,M
∗
1 ∈ M and sk
∗ to C
as his choice, where TempID∗ has not been sent as a
UserKeyGen query. C flips a coin b
$
← {0, 1}, runs
SendRequest(gpk, sk∗, TempID∗, Adrsrc, Adrdst , Adrproxy)
and C∗ ← SendContent(gpk, σ, TempID,M∗b , Adrproxy),
and sends (σ, TempID∗, Adrdst) and C
∗ to A.
4. A is allowed to issue the UserKeyGen query TempID ∈
ID where TempID 6= TempID∗. C runs UserKeyGen(params,
msk, TempID) and returns dkTempID.
5. Finally, A outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The protocol is said to have semantic security if Advsspro,A(λ) :=
|Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| is negligible in λ.
Finally, we define unforgeability which guarantees that no
adversaryA who does not have a signing key will be accepted
by the ValidityCheck algorithm. In this game, A is modeled
as a malicious user. Moreover, A is allowed to obtain msk
in order to guarantee that nobody can be accepted by SP
even by KGC.
Definition 3.5 (Unforgeability).
1. The challenger C runs (gpk, ik) ← GM.Setup(1λ) and
(params,msk)← KGC.Setup(1λ), and gives gpk, params,
and msk to an adversary A. Moreover, C initializes
S = ∅.
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2. A is allowed to issue the SendRequest query (i, TempID).
If ski has not been generated, then C runs ski ← Join(gpk, ik)
and preserves ski. C runs SendRequest(gpk, ski, TempID,
Adrsrc, Adrdst , Adrproxy), and sends σ to A. Moreover,
C appends (σ, TempID) to S.
3. Finally, A outputs (σ∗, TempID∗). We say that A wins
if (σ∗, TempID∗) 6∈ S and ValidityCheck(gpk, σ∗, TempID∗)
= 1.
The protocol is said to have unforgeability if Advufpro,A(λ) :=
Pr[A wins] is negligible in λ.
We say that a protocol is called secure anonymous authenti-
cation protocol if the protocol is correct and has anonymity,
semantic security, and unforgeability.
3.2 Protocol Construction
Here, we give our proposed protocol construction. First,
we define the syntax of building blocks - IBE and open-free
group signature - as follows:
An IBE scheme IBE consists of four algorithms: i.e.,
(IBE.Setup,Extract, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec). Let ID and M be
an identity space and message space, respectively.
Definition 3.6 (Syntax of IBE [9]).
IBE.Setup: This algorithm takes as input the security param-
eter λ, and outputs a public key params and a master
secret key msk.
Extract: This algorithm takes as input params, msk, and
an identity ID ∈ ID, and outputs a decryption key
dkID.
IBE.Enc: This algorithm takes as input params, ID, and a
message M ∈ M, and outputs a ciphertext CIBE .
IBE.Dec: This algorithm takes as input params, CIBE , and
dkID, and outputs M .
We require the following correctness property: for all (params,
msk)← IBE.Setup(1λ), all ID and allM , Pr[IBE.Dec(params,
IBE.Enc(params, ID,M),Extract(params,msk, ID)) =M ] =
1 holds.
An open-free group signature scheme GS consists of four
algorithms: (GS.Setup, Join,Sign,Verify)7 as follows:
Definition 3.7 (Open-Free Group Signature).
GS.Setup: This algorithm takes as input the security param-
eter λ, and outputs a group public key gpk and an is-
suer key ik.
GS.Join: This algorithm takes as input gpk and ik (from
GM), and a user is obtained a signing key sk.
Sign: This algorithm takes as input gpk, a signing key sk,
and a message M , and outputs a group signature σ.
Verify: This algorithm takes as input gpk, σ, and M , and
outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on M , and 0 other-
wise.
7This new primitive is a kind of dynamic group signature,
where a new member can join the system even after the
setup phase. Note that, additional two algorithms, Open
and Judge, are usually contained in dynamic group signa-
tures (e.g. [7]). The Judge algorithm checks a proof output
by the Open algorithm, whether the Open algorithm is cor-
rectly executed or not. Obviously, the Judge algorithm is
meaningless in the open-free variant.
We require the following correctness property: for all (gpk, ik)
← GS.Setup(1λ) and sk ← GS.Join(gpk, ik), Pr[Verify(gpk,
Sign(gpk, sk,M),M) = 1] = 1 holds.
Next, we give our proposed construction. In this construc-
tion, a signed message of the underlying group signature is
TempID which is also regarded as a public key of the under-
lying IBE.
Construction 3.1 (Proposed Protocol).
GM.Setup : Run (gpk, ik)← GS.Setup(1λ), and output (gpk,
ik).
KGC.Setup : Run (params,msk)← IBE.Setup(1λ), and out-
put (params,msk).
Join : Run sk ← GS.Join(gpk, ik), and output sk.
UserKeyGen : Run dkTempID ← Extract(params,msk, TempID),
and output dkTempID.
SendRequest : Choose TempID
$
← ID. Run σ ← Sign(gpk, sk,
TempID), and send (σ, TempID, Adrdst) to the proxy whose
IP address is Adrproxy.
RelayRequest : Append (TempID, Adrsrc) to Tbl, and relays
a pair (σ, TempID) and Adrproxy to the destination SP
whose IP address is Adrdst.
ValidityCheck : Output 1 if Verify(gpk, σ, TempID) = 1, and
0, otherwise.
SendContent : Output ⊥ if ValidityCheck(gpk, σ, TempID) =
0. Otherwise, run CIBE ← IBE.Enc(params,TempID,
M), and send CIBE to the proxy whose IP address is
Adrproxy.
RelayContent : Relay CIBE to a user whose IP address is
Adrsrc contained in Tbl. Moreover, remove (TempID,
Adrsrc) from Tbl.
GetContent : Output the result of IBE.Dec(params,CIBE ,
dkTempID).
Note that our the above construction only considers one-
proxy setting, and therefore no anonymity is guaranteed
from the viewpoint of the Proxy, since the Proxy directly
relays communications between the User and SP. Note that
this situation does not contradict our definition of anonymity
(Def. 3.3). We can simply extend this protocol to a multi-
proxy setting, where each Proxy relays (σ, TempID) or CIBE
between the previous Proxy and the next Proxy. Then,
anonymity is guaranteed even from the Proxies’ point of
view unless all Proxies collude with each other.
4. GROUP SIGNATURE
The proposed secure anonymous authentication protocol
uses a group signature scheme as its fundamental compo-
nent. Though arbitrary group signature schemes could be
used (i.e., by ignoring open functionality), it is beneficial to
remove unnecessary functionality and improve performance
efficiency, thus the proposed protocol in Section 3.2 uses a
group signature without open functionality. We call this an
open-free group signature8. This section defines the security
of such signatures.
8A difference between ring signature [20] and open-free
group signature is as follows. In ring signature schemes,
a signer chooses a set of other members, and signs on behalf
of the group of users. The anonymity of the signer cannot be
revoked in contrast to group signature schemes. However,
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4.1 Defining Open-free Group Signature
In this section, we redefine the security definitions of the
Furukawa-Imai group signature scheme, anonymity, trace-
ability, and non-frameability, to match the open-free variant.
Anonymity guarantees that no adversary A can distinguish
whether two signers of group signatures are the same or
not, even if A has the corresponding signing keys. Usually,
there are two kind of anonymity, CPA-anonymity and CCA-
anonymity. In CCA-anonymity, A is allowed to issue open
queries, where A sends (σ,M), and is given the result of
the Open algorithm. Meanwhile, we do not have to consider
these differences due to the open-free property.
Definition 4.1 (Anonymity).
1. An adversary A with the security parameter λ sends
gpk, sk0, sk1, and M to the challenger C.
2. C chooses b
$
← {0, 1}, computes σ∗ ← Sign(gpk, skb,M),
and sends σ∗ to A.
3. A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
An open-free group signature GS is said to have anonymity
if AdvanonGS,A(λ) := |Pr[b = b
′]− 1/2| is negligible in λ.
Next, we redefine traceability. In usual definition, Trace-
ability guarantees that no adversary A can produce a valid-
but-untraceable group signature, that is, theOpen algorithm
cannot identify the corresponding signer though the Verify
algorithm outputs 1. However, in the open-free variant, this
definition is meaningless. So, we define unforgeability here
instead of traceability, where no adversary A can produce a
valid group signature without knowing a signing key.
Definition 4.2 (Unforgeability).
1. The challenger C runs (gpk, ik) ← GS.Setup(1λ), and
gives gpk to an adversary A.
2. A is allowed to issue the signing query (M, i). If a
user Ui has not been joined to the system, then C runs
the GS.Join algorithm, computes ski, and returns σ ←
Sign(gpk, ski,M) to A. If Ui has been joined to the
system, then C returns σ ← Sign(gpk, ski,M) to A.
Moreover, C appends (σ,M) into the list S.
3. Finally, A outputs (σ∗,M∗). We say that A wins if
Verify(gpk, σ∗,M∗) = 1 holds and (σ∗,M∗) 6∈ S.
An open-free group signature GS is said to have unforgeabil-
ity if AdvunGS,A(λ) := Pr[A wins] is negligible in λ.
Finally, we revisit non-frameability. Non-frameability guar-
antees that no adversary A can produce a valid group sig-
nature whose open result is an honest (i.e., uncorrupted by
A) user (say U). Obviously, this definition is meaningless
in the open-free variant, and therefore we do not consider
non-frameability.
Note that in order to achieve non-frameability in the orig-
inal scheme, a user chooses a secret key usk, and is obtained
its signing key sk by executing the GS.Join algorithm with
GM. What is critical, GM cannot know usk itself (but can
convince that the user knows usk by using zero-knowledge
a signer needs to involve/choose other members when the
signer signs, and therefore needs to know other members.
This does not match our setting.
proofs). In other words, we can remove a secret key usk
from the syntax of group signature unless non-frameability
is required. This is is the reason why we do not require any
secret key of users as input of the GS.Join algorithm, and
the GS.Join algorithm can be a non-interactive algorithm.
4.2 Building Open-Free Group Signature
Our group signature scheme modifies the Furukawa-Imai
group signature [13]. In the Furukawa-Imai scheme, a user
certificate issued by the GM is a short signature [8]. The user
proves the possession of the certificate by NIZK proofs which
are constructed via the Fiat-Shamir conversion [12]. For
implementing the Open algorithm, an ElGamal-type double
encryption is used over a decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)-
hard group (in addition to bilinear groups). In our open-
free scheme, the DDH-hard group can be removed. Other
part is the same as that of the original Furukawa-Imai group
signature scheme.
Note that, a simple construction, where for one signature
verification/signing key pair (VK,SK), each group member
shares SK, can also be seen as an open-free group signature
scheme. However, this simple construction never realizes the
revocation functionality [17]. Towards constructing a revo-
cable open-free group signature scheme, we newly construct
an open-free group signature scheme.
Construction 4.1 (Proposed Open-Free Group Signature).
GS.Setup: Let (G1,G2,GT ) be a bilinear group with prime
order p, where 〈g1〉 = G1, 〈g2〉 = G2, and e : G1 ×
G2 → GT be a bilinear map
9. Choose γ
$
← Zp, and
h
$
← G1, and compute W = g
γ
2 . Output gpk =
(G1,G2,GT , e, g1, g2, h,W, e(g1, g2), e(g1,W ),H3) and ik
= γ, where H3 : {0, 1}
∗ → Zp is a hash function mod-
eled as a random oracle.
GS.Join: For a user Ui, choose xi, yi
$
← Zp, compute Ai =
(g1h
−yi)
1
γ+xi , and output ski = (xi, yi, Ai).
Sign: Let sk = (x, y,A). Choose β
$
← Zp, set δ = βx −
y, and compute T = Ahβ . Choose rx, rδ, rβ
$
← Zp,
and compute R = e(h, g2)
rδe(h,W )rβ/e(T, g2)
rx , c =
H3(gpk, T,R,M), sx = rx + cx, sδ = rδ + cδ, and
sβ = rβ + cβ, and output σ = (T, c, sx, sδ, sβ).
Verify: Compute R′ = e(h,g2)
sδ e(h,W )
sβ
e(T,g2)sx
(
e(T,W )
e(g1,g2)
)−c
, and out-
put 1 if c = H3(gpk, T,R
′,M) holds, and 0 otherwise.
Compared to the original Furukawa-Imai scheme, we can
reduce three DDH-hard group elements and three Zp ele-
ments. Accordingly, we can reduce the size of signature by
50% compared to the original Furukawa-Imai group signa-
ture scheme.
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION
9We require bilinearity: for all a, b ∈ Zp, e(g
a
1 , g
b
2) =
e(g1, g2)
ab = e(gb1, g
a
2 ), and non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1GT ,
where 1GT is the identity element in GT .
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5.1 Analysis on Proposed Protocol
We can prove that our proposed protocol is secure if the
underlying IBE scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure (like the Boneh-
Franklin IBE scheme [9]) and the underlying group signa-
ture scheme is anonymous and unforgeable. We only give a
sketch of proof of anonymity (other theorems can be simi-
larly proved) here and omit the full proofs of the following
theorems due to the page limitation.
Theorem 5.1. Our protocol is anonymous if the under-
lying group signature scheme is anonymous.
Proof (Sketch). Let A be an adversary who can break
anonymity of our protocol. Then, we can construct an al-
gorithm B that breaks anonymity of the underlying group
signature scheme as follow. Let C be the challenger of the un-
derlying group signature. B generates gpk, sk0, and sk1, and
generates all IBE-related values. Then B gives (gpk, sk0, sk1,
params,msk) to A. In the challenge phase, B gets TempID∗
from A, forwards it to C, and gets σ∗ from C. B uses σ∗
as the output of the SendRequest algorithm, and similarly
simulates other algorithms. A outputs b′ and B also outputs
b′ as the guessing bit. Then, B can break anonymity of the
group signature with the same advantage of A. This contra-
dicts that the underlying group signature is anonymous.
Theorem 5.2. Our protocol is semantic secure if the un-
derlying IBE scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure.
Theorem 5.3. Our protocol is unforgeable if the under-
lying group signature scheme is unforgeable.
5.2 Analysis on Group Signature
The remaining part is to show that the proposed open-free
group signature scheme is anonymous and unforgeable. The
proposed open-free group signature scheme is constructed
from an (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
by using the Fiat-Shamir conversion [12]. First, we explain
the original proof of knowledge protocol as follows. A prover
computes (T,R), and sends it to a verifier. The verifier
sends a challenge value c to the prover. The prover com-
putes (sx, sδ, sβ), and sends it to the verifier. The verifier
checks whether the verification equation holds or not. Next,
we show that this 3-move protocol is zero-knowledge (this
immediately leads to anonymity). The simulator chooses
A
$
← G and β
$
← Zp, and computes T = Ag
β
1 . Note that β is
chosen uniformly random. Therefore, T generated from the
simulator is drawn from a distribution that is indistinguish-
able from the distribution output by any particular prover.
For T ∈ G, the simulator chooses c, sx, sδ, sβ
$
← Zp, and
computes R = e(h,g2)
sδ e(h,W )
sβ
e(T,g2)sx
(
e(T,W )
e(g1,g2)
)−c
. Then the tran-
script (T,R, c, sx, sδ, sβ) here is indistinguishable from tran-
scripts of the actual protocol.
Next, we show that the protocol is a proof of knowledge.
That is, we show there exists an extractor that can extract
a SDH pair from (T,R, c, sx, sδ, sβ) and (T,R, c
′, s′x, s
′
δ, s
′
β),
where c 6= c′ and both transcripts satisfy the verification
equation. Set x˜ :=
sx−s
′
x
c−c′
, y˜ :=
(sx−s
′
x)(sβ−s
′
β)−(sδ−s
′
δ)(c−c
′)
(c−c′)2
,
and β˜ :=
sβ−s
′
β
c−c′
. Then, e(T,W )
e(g1,g2)
= e(h,g2)
β˜x˜−y˜e(h,W )β˜
e(T,g2)x˜
holds.
Therefore, for A˜ = T/hβ˜ , e(A˜, gx˜W ) = e(g1, g2)e(h, g2)
−y˜
holds. That is, (x˜, y˜, A˜) can be extracted. This immediately
leads to unforgeability. We omit the formal proof since this
is similar as that of the original Furukawa-Imai scheme.
5.3 Prototype
This section introduces a prototype that implements the
proposed protocol and evaluates its performance to demon-
strate the feasibility and practicality of the protocol.
5.3.1 Implementation
We built the User and SP modules by using C language
(GCC version 4.2.1). We also used the TEPLA library [4] for
implementing the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme and our open-
free group signature scheme. This library supports optimal
Ate pairings over Barreto-Naehrig (BN) elliptic curves [6]
with 254-bit prime order and the corresponding embedded
degree is 12. This enables 128-bit security. We used Sim-
pleproxy [3] for the Proxy module.
Three types of communication sequences are implemented,
i.e., User-GM, User-KGC, and User-Proxy-SP, and each of
the sequence runs the modules defined in Section 3.2. The
User-GM sequence begins with the Join module, which com-
municates with the GM. The GM then computes the signing
key sk, and returns it to the User. The User-KGC sequence
begins with the UserKeyGen module, which communicates
with the KGC. The User sends TempID to the KGC, and
the KGC then computes the decryption key dkTempID , and
returns it to the User. The User-Proxy-SP sequence begins
with the SendRequest module that sends a group signature
and TempID. Upon receiving them, the Proxy runs RelayRe-
quest module that forwards them to the SP. It then runs Va-
lidityCheck module and SendContent module that returns
an IBE ciphertext to the Proxy, which forwards that to the
User. The User then runs GetContent module that decrypts
the IBE ciphertext by using the corresponding dkTempID.
Note that the User-GM sequence needs to be run before
User-Proxy-SP sequence starts. Likewise, the User-KGC
and User-Proxy-SP sequences are run in parallel, though
the User-KGC procedure needs to be completed before User-
Proxy-SP procedure’s GetContent module is run.
ProxyUser
SendRequest (http write)
SP
ValidityCheck
GetContent (http read)
SendContent (http send)
RelayRequest (http get)
RelayContent (http send)
group signature
and TempID
group signature
and TempID
IBE ciphertext
IBE ciphertext
Figure 2: Sequences for User-Proxy-SP
5.3.2 Performance Measurement
An environment for performance evaluation of the pro-
posed protocol was prepared. We used an Apple MacBookPro
15inch mid 2010 (processor: 2.8GHz Intel Core i7, Mem-
ory: 8GB, 1067 MHz DDR3, Darwin Kernel Version 12.4.0),
and prepared two VMs by using VMware Fusion 5.0.3. We
assigned the roles of the User to the MacOS the roles of
the Proxy and SP on the VMs. For the Proxy, the VM
ran FreeBSD amd64 9.1-RELEASE with one processor and
256MB of memory, and for the SP, VM ran CentOS 5.9
x86 64 with one processor and 512MB of memory.
Here, we show that our protocol is feasible by showing
the running time of algorithms and total running time of
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one session are msec order. First, we show the running time
of one session (User→Proxy→SP→Proxy→User) in the fol-
lowing cases: (1) HTTP communications (i.e., without any
cryptographic operations), (2) SSL communications, and (3)
our protocol in Table 1. To measure the running time of the
SSL communication, we use the s server/s time command
of the OpenSSL library (ver. 1.0.1e) [1]. We use DHE-RSA-
AES128-SHA256 cipher suite with a 3072-bit size public key
since this also supports 128-bit security, as in ours.
Table 1: Running Time (one session)
Scheme Time(msec) Cryptographic Operations
None 4.714 -
SSL 12.897 Enc/Auth
Ours 624.743 Enc/Anon. Auth
Table 1 shows that the running time of our protocol is ap-
proximately 50-times slower than that of SSL communica-
tions. This inefficiency is due to the pairing computation
which is not required in usual public key encryption, digital
signature, and authentication (these are used in SSL). Nev-
ertheless, it is particularly worth noting that our running
time still fits inside millisecond order, and our protocol even
supports secure, anonymous, and authenticated communi-
cation, simultaneously.
For reference, Table 2 gives the running time of each al-
gorithm. Note that the GM.Setup, KGC.Setup, and Join al-
gorithms can be run offline, and the UserKeyGen algorithm
can be run separately against the session. Moreover, we
ignore the RelayRequest and RelayContent algorithms since
these (run by Proxy) just relay the communication, and are
run independently against any cryptographic operations.
Table 2: Running Time (algorithms)
Algorithm Time(msec) Entity
GM.Setup 105.712 GM
KGC.Setup 102.883 KGC
Join 109.036 User-GM
UserKeyGen 102.958 User-KGC
SendRequest 125.069 User
ValidityCheck 199.247 SP
SendContent 198.636 SP
GetContent 101.158 User
The dominant factor for User is the SendRequest algorithm
which computes a group signature. Note that this procedure
can also be run offline by assuming that the User chooses
TempID and computes a group signature before starting a
session. Then, the total running time of one session becomes
less than 500 msec.
6. CONCLUSION
The proposed protocol along with our group signature en-
ables secure anonymous authentication. It is feasible and
practical in terms of transaction time. Although this paper
proved its concept, we need to consider practical deployment
over the Internet. Indeed, the protocol requires a proxy that
assists secure, anonymous, and authenticated communica-
tion. Though various types of proxy may exist, including
Tor routers, we need to consider and verify the adaptability
of our protocol to the current infrastructure. On the other
hand, assorted anonymous communication systems [5, 15,
19] have risks of being used by malicious parties. One rea-
son for that is their inability to authenticate users. Properly
applying our protocol may enable these systems to be prop-
erly used. Through this work, we wish to facilitate secure,
anonymous, and authenticated communication over the In-
ternet.
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